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Law, Politics, and Financial Development: 
The Great Reversal of the U.K. Corporate 
Debt Market 
 
CHRISTOPHER COYLE AND JOHN D. TURNER 
 
This article examines the role of creditor protection in the development of the 
U.K. corporate bond market. This market grew rapidly in the late nineteenth 
century, but in the twentieth century it experienced a reversal, albeit with a 
short-lived post-1945 renaissance. Such was the extent of the reversal that the 
market from the 1970s onwards was smaller than it had been in 1870. We find 
that law does not explain the variation in the size of this market over time. 
Alternatively, our evidence suggests that inflation and taxation policies 
were major drivers of this market in the post-1945 era.  
  
inancial development usually occurs if the “correct” set of 
institutions and laws are in place. The legal origins theory argues 
that these are largely determined by a country’s legal family (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2000;  
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008; Levine 1999). Political 
economy theories, on the other hand, argue that the institutions in place 
will largely be determined by a country’s political system, which can be 
influenced by exogenous shocks such as wars or changes in openness to 
trade (Rajan and Zingales 2003; Roe 2006; Perotti and Von Thadden 
2006; Roe and Siegel 2009). In this article, we examine the evolution  
of the U.K. domestic corporate debt market from its inception in the 
middle of the nineteenth century until the twenty-first century in an 
attempt to understand the role played by law in the development of 
financial markets. 
 Using annual data for the period 18602002, we find that after  
nearly 50 years of growth from 1860 onwards, the U.K. corporate  
bond market experienced a great reversal in the twentieth century.  
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After a post-1945 renaissance, the U.K. corporate bond market went 
into permanent decline in the 1970s. The collapse of this market in the 
1970s meant that it was smaller in real terms than it had been in the 1870s. 
In terms of the number of traded corporate bonds, the U.K. corporate 
bond market was smaller in the 1990s than it had been a century 
earlier.  
 The proponents of the law and finance hypothesis argue that legal 
origin and investor protection laws determine financial development  
(La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer 
2008). However, despite its historical nature, most of the tests of  
this hypothesis have been cross-sectional and ahistorical in nature.1  
One notable exception is Aldo Musacchio (2008a, 2010) who finds little 
evidence to support the law and finance hypothesis and suggests that  
to comprehend the variation in modern financial development, we need  
to understand the effect of the catastrophic events of the twentieth 
century.2 In this article, we examine changes in U.K. creditor protection 
from 1860 to 2002 to see if it is driving the development of the U.K. 
corporate bond market. As such, this is one of the first long-run times 
series tests of the law and finance hypothesis.3 As the creditor protection 
score remains high (at four out of four) for the United Kingdom over 
this entire period, it cannot possibly explain the variation over time in the 
size of the bond market. 
 Given that law does not explain the variation in bond market size over 
time, in this article we also explore what was driving the development 
of the bond market, particularly its post-1945 renaissance and its post-
1970 demise. We have two hypotheses: (a) inflation explains the  
post-1970 demise of the U.K. bond market, and (b) tax changes which 
affected the capital structure preferences of firms explain the post-
1945 renaissance of the market. The demise that preceded the postwar 
renaissance was mainly due to the nationalization of many large 
companies which issued bonds. Using data on bond returns and issues, 
 
1 Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007) use an event-study approach to examine the effect 
of changes in creditor rights on private credit across 129 countries, but the law and finance 
literature does not examine long-run time-series evidence on financial development.  
2 Cheffins, Bank, and Wells (2012) look at the interaction of U.S. shareholder protection laws 
and stock market development over the period 19301970. Armour et al., (2009) and Sarkar  
and Singh (2010) use a longitudinal shareholder protection index covering United Kingdom, 
United States, Germany, France, and India for 19702005 to examine the relationship between 
financial development and investor protection. Notably, all of these papers find evidence which 
rejects the law and finance hypothesis.  
3 There are two studies related to our article which also look at the long-run development of 
financial markets. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) argue that law did not affect the evolution of 
corporate ownership in the United Kingdom over the twentieth century. Biais and Green (2007) 
find that the migration of bonds from the New York Stock Exchange to OTC markets in the 
twentieth century can be explained by the rise of institutional investors.  
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we find that inflation plays a major part in the demise of the U.K. 
corporate bond market. In addition, our evidence reveals that companies 
took advantage of the increased tax shield in the post-1945 era by issuing 
more bonds. Inflation and tax changes, however, are only proximate 
causes of changes in the U.K. bond market, since they reflect broader 
macroeconomic policy goals.  
 Richard S. Grossman (2002, p. 128) has suggested that the growth of 
the corporate bond market in late Victorian Britain is an important agenda 
requiring further research. Our article not only measures the growth of 
the corporate bond market in the Victorian period by providing annual 
estimates of its size and performance, but we also place this initial  
growth in the context of its long-term twentieth-century demise. 
Although the historiography of British capital markets has discussed 
the use of corporate bonds by nineteenth-century companies (Jefferys 
1977, pp. 24192), institutional and individual investors in debentures 
(Raynes 1928; Sheppard 1971, pp. 15456; Scott 2002; Maltby et al. 
2011; Michie 2011, p. 163; Rutterford et al. 2011), and the interwar 
issuance of debt (Grant 1967, p. 166; Thomas 1978, p. 36; Chambers 
2010, p. 57), there have been no studies which have examined the size, 
performance, and drivers of the market over the long run. In terms of  
the performance of the corporate bond market, K. C. Smith and G. F. 
Horne (1934) as well as Edelstein (1976, 2010) assess the returns on  
a limited number of high-class corporate bonds for 18671933 and 1870
1913 respectively.4 In contrast, our examination of performance looks at 
the nearly all traded corporate bonds from 1860 to 2002. Apart from 
Musacchio (2010), who has developed several point estimates for the 
early twentieth century, we know of no other attempt to assess the size of 
the U.K. domestic corporate bond market over the long run. 
 This article augments the small but growing literature which examines 
the effect of legal protection and origins on financial development from  
an historical perspective.5 As with the vast majority of this literature, this 
article finds little evidence to support the law and finance hypothesis.6  
 
4 Smith and Horne’s index of fixed interest securities for 18671933 includes Consols, bonds 
of municipal authorities, as well as London and North-Western railway debentures. Edelstein’s 
study of realized returns on U.K. and overseas investments contains 65 domestic debentures in 
1910, whereas our series of returns contains 422 debentures in that year. Raynes (1928, 1937) 
provides figures on the annual income generated between 1912 and 1936 by a small number of 
debentures of blue-chip companies. 
5 See, for example, Cheffins (2001); Campbell and Turner (2011); Fohlin (2007); Guinnane  
et al. (2007); Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005); Malmendier (2009); Musacchio (2008b, 2009, 
2010); Roe (2006).  
6 One exception is Bordo and Rousseau (2006), but their measure of financial development 
(ratio broad money to GDP) is more a measure of banking rather than financial market 
development.  
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 The findings of our article may also have some bearing on the 
extensive literature on whether banks failed British industry.7 Notably, 
we show that when the bond market contracted in the 1970s, recently 
liberalized banks, which were no longer constrained by government 
policy regarding their lending, met the high demand from companies  
for debt finance. This article also contributes to the growing literature 
which examines returns on U.K. financial assets over the long run 
by adding another asset class to aid our understanding of asset pricing 
in the long run.8  
 
THE U.K. CORPORATE BOND MARKET, 18602002 
 
 The traditional U.K. appellation for corporate bond, as well as bonds 
issued by municipal authorities and government-controlled entities,  
is debenture.9 Debentures include any long-term debt secured on the 
assets of the company.10 Our study commences in 1860 when an active 
debenture market first arose in the United Kingdom (Jefferys 1977,  
pp. 24151).11 
 As we are interested in the size and performance of the domestic 
corporate bond market, we collected data on debentures issued by U.K. 
companies. We excluded all financial companies that issued debentures 
from our data set as these firms were mainly financial trusts which 
issued debentures with the aim of investing the bulk of the proceeds  
in the equities and debentures of foreign companies (Jefferys 1977,  
p. 262).  
 A company was considered to be a U.K. company if its corporate 
headquarters and the main market where its securities traded were in  
the United Kingdom and its main activities were based in the United 
Kingdom.12 This information was obtained from a combination of  
the Investor’s Monthly Manual (18641930); Burdett’s Official 
 
7 See, for example, Baker and Collins (1999); Capie and Collins (1992); Collins (1990, 
1991); Collins and Baker (2001, 2003); Kennedy (1987). 
8 See Acheson et al. (2009); Grossman (2002); Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002). 
9 Technically, debentures which are traded on public markets are known as debenture stocks 
(Simonson 1920, pp. 46). 
10 A charge on the company’s assets was not always implied by the use of the word debenture 
(Manson 1894, p. 35), but over time the word debenture in the United Kingdom has come to 
mean secured debt. 
11 For example, railway debentures are not quoted in the Course of the Exchange until 1860.  
12 The criteria used to determine whether a company was located in the United Kingdom  
or overseas was based on the (a) the section in which it appears in the relevant stock exchange 
yearbook (e.g., Foreign Railways), (b) the company’s name (e.g., New Zealand and Australia 
Land Co., Ltd.), or (c) if the company had a head office in a foreign country of operation as well 
as one in the United Kingdom.  
814 Coyle and Turner  
  
Intelligence (18821898), the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 
(18991933), and the Stock Exchange Yearbook (19342002).  
 In order to estimate the annual size, value, and performance of  
the debenture market, we gathered data on debenture coupon rates,  
the number of outstanding debenture stocks, the nominal value of 
debentures (which was usually £100), and debenture prices (which were 
based on transactions at which business was done) on the last day of 
December.13  
 Our data was obtained from three main sources. First, debenture  
data for the period 18601863 was hand collected from the Course of  
the Exchange (COE). Second, data for the period 18641929 was culled 
from the Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM). As we shall see below,  
the change in sources had no effect on the number of debentures in the 
sample.  
 For the remainder of the sample period, we relied on the Stock 
Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL); hard copies of which are 
available at the Guildhall Library in London for the period 19302002. 
Unlike the IMM, by 1930 SEDOL contains a comprehensive list of  
all securities (no matter how minor) traded in the United Kingdom’s 
various stock exchanges.14 As we will see below, its comprehensive 
nature results in a jump in the number of corporate bonds in 1930, 
whenever our data sources change. However, most of these additional 
debentures are very small issues as the total value of debentures 
changes relatively little between 1929 and 1930.15 As the post-1946 
copies of SEDOL do not contain the capital outstanding for each 
debenture issue, we collected this data at decadal intervals from the 
Stock Exchange Yearbook. 
 A key issue in this study is that debenture securities are correctly 
identified in our three data sources. The COE had a separate section for 
railway debentures and debentures in other sectors were clearly labeled 
as such. In the cases of the IMM and SEDOL, we only collected  
data where “deb” or “debenture” was tagged alongside or below the 
company’s name.  
  
 
13 On the rare occasions when an end-of-year price was unavailable, the last price available or 
the midpoint of the bid-ask spread (this was only available from 1930 onwards in our data 
sources) was used. As the London Stock Exchange was closed for five months at the end of 
1914, we use the price from 30th July 1914 as the end-of-year price. 
14 There was no OTC market in the United Kingdom for corporate bonds and equities for 
most of our sample period. After the stock market reforms of 1986, an OTC market developed, 
and SEDOL contains securities traded on this market. 
15 The total value of debentures increased 9 percent between 1929 and 1930. However, the 
value of the debenture market increased by an average of 7 percent each year between 1860 and 
1946. 
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 The point estimates developed by A. Essex-Crosby (1938) for 1885, 
1895, and 1915 report a substantially higher figure for the total value  
of the debenture market than we find.16 Essex-Crosby uses Burdett’s 
Official Intelligence (BOI) to develop his estimates of the size of the 
U.K. debenture market. Apart from the fact that we exclude financial 
companies, there are two reasons for this difference. First, we exclude 
foreign companies. Second, it was common for many companies at this 
time to have debentures which were not publicly issued and were not 
traded on markets (Jefferys 1977, p. 286).17 For example, the par value 
of our brewery debentures in 1895 is £17.4 million, whereas the total 
par value of brewery debentures in Burdett’s Official Intelligence in 
1895 is £33.8 million. Debentures issued by foreign companies account 
for £8.9 million of this difference and debentures which are not publicly 
traded accounts for another £7.3 million. 
 Figures 1 and 2 (as well as Appendix Table 1) show the development 
of the U.K. debenture market in terms of number and par value of 
debentures. The most remarkable finding is that the U.K. debenture 
market has experienced a Rajan-and-Zingales-type great reversal, with 
the number of debentures and the real par value of debentures at  
the end of the twentieth century below their levels in 1870 and 1894 
respectively.  
 The debenture market grew rapidly in its first four decades. Up until 
the late 1880s, at least 75 percent of debentures were issued by railways 
(Appendix Table 1), and railways dominated in terms of par value.18 
During the 1870s, however, small debenture issues were made by gas 
companies, iron, coal and steel companies, and commercial/industrial 
companies. In the case of the latter two sectors, preexisting firms 
converted to public limited companies, and viewed debentures as  
a way of raising additional capital (Jefferys 1977, p. 252). As can be  
seen from Appendix Table 1, from the late 1880s until just before  
1913, there was a significant increase in the number and value of 
non-railway debentures. This growth came mainly from debentures 
issued by breweries and commercial/industrial companies (see 
Appendix Table 1).19  
 
16 The figures can be found in Jefferys (1977, pp. 45860). 
17 Private debentures appear to be a pre-1913 phenomenon as there is little evidence in stock 
exchange manuals of them being used after 1913 
18 Railway debentures played an important role in familiarizing investors with corporate 
bonds (Jefferys 1977, p. 246). 
19 See Watson (1996), Jefferys (1977, p. 268) and Cottrell (1980, p. 168) on the conversion of 
the breweries and their widespread use of debentures. 
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FIGURE 1 
NUMBER OF DOMESTIC DEBENTURES TRADED ON U.K. STOCK EXCHANGES, 18602002 
 
Notes: The series is broken between 1929 and 1930 due to a change in our data sources. 
Sources: Course of the Exchange (18601863); Investor’s Monthly Manual (18641929); Stock 
Exchange Daily Official List (19302002). 
 
 The debenture market reached its peak in 1909 (as measured by total 
par value in real terms). Railway debentures constituted 63.5 percent of 
total par value. Indeed, debentures were so popular that new businesses 
going public often issued debentures and equity in the proportion of 
one-third to two-thirds (Jefferys 1977, pp. 27072, 45860). At its peak 
in 1909, the par value of debentures was 22 percent of GDP, but by 
1919 it had fallen to just below 8 percent of GDP (Figure 2), following 
the high inflation during of World War I. The market staged something 
of a recovery between 1920 and 1939, with new debenture issues by 
brewing, commercial, and industrial companies in the early 1930s. 
Although our data series for the number of debentures (Figure 1) is 
affected by the change in data sources in 1930, the downward trend in 
debenture issues from 1909 to 1946 is still noticeable, despite a series 
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FIGURE 2 
 VALUE OF DOMESTIC DEBENTURES TRADED ON U.K. STOCK EXCHANGES, 18601999 
 
Sources: Course of the Exchange (18601863); Investor’s Monthly Manual (18641929); Stock 
Exchange Daily Official List (19301999); Stock Exchange Official Yearbook (19591999). 
GDP data is from Officer (2011). O’Donoghue, Goulding, and Allen (2004) is used to convert 
the nominal value into real terms. 
 
of new debenture issues in the early 1930s.20 From 1909 until 1929 six 
debentures disappeared annually on average, and between 1939 and 
1946 the number of debentures declined from 519 to 319.21  
 As Figure 1 shows, the debenture market rebounded after 1946. 
The number of debentures on the market in the 1960s reached its  
all-time peak.22 Despite the increase in the number of different bonds, 
their par value fell between 1946 and 1959 (Figure 2). This is largely 
explained by the fact that 70 percent of the total par value of debentures 
in 1946 belonged to companies that would be nationalized within  
a matter of months. In addition, the companies which issued debentures 
in the two decades after 1946 were commercial or industrial  
  
 
20 New debenture issues were just less than or exceeded new equity issues from 1930 to 1933 
(Grant 1967, p. 166). 
21 A large number of the debentures disappeared in the 1920s due to the government-
orchestrated mergers of the large railway companies following the Railway Act of 1921. 
22 As can be seen from Appendix Table 1, the number of debentures increased substantially  
in 1947. The immediate reversal of this increase in 1948 was due to the nationalization of 
railways, gas, and electric lighting and power companies. 
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companies (i.e., electronics, textiles, television, chemicals, plastics, 
automobiles, and aircraft), which did not have the same capital 
needs as those companies which had been nationalized. 
 One estimate puts debentures share of company borrowing in  
19651969 at 42.5 percent,23 another suggests that from 1963 to 1972, 
15 percent of external funds raised by industrial and commercial 
companies came from debenture issues (Wilson Committee 1980,  
p. 51). As can be seen from Figure 1, the debenture market began a 
rapid decline after 1970, such that by the late 1990s, the market was 
smaller than it had been a century earlier. In terms of its value (in real 
terms), the collapse of the market in the 1970s meant that for the rest  
of the century, the debenture market was smaller than it had been  
in 1870.24 The swift demise of the debenture market resulted in 
commentators suggesting in the early 1980s that the market was 
“virtually dead.”25 Figure 3, which shows the value of the debenture 
market relative to the total market value of domestic corporate securities, 
reveals that the debenture market was a relatively important part of the 
U.K. domestic capital market up until 1913. However, after World War 
II, the debenture market, despite its brief revival in the 1960s, was a small 
part of the action. 
 In terms of other corporate bond markets, in 1913, the U.K. domestic 
market was large; only the United States, France, and Spain had  
larger bond markets relative to GDP, but the difference was slight  
 
 
23 “Three Proposals for Britain’s Budget on March 9th,” The Economist, Feb. 27th 1982, p. 13. 
24 During the 1950s and 1960s growing amounts of debt capital were raised through the issue 
of short-term, unsecured loan stocks. These securities were initially used by companies involved 
in North Sea oil exploration (Thomas 1978, p. 153), and during the 1960s they were used to 
finance takeover bids (“Loan Stock for Takeover Bidders,” The Times, December 24th 1968). 
During the 1960s convertible loan stock became increasingly common (Samuels and Wilkes 
1975, p. 79). Although the number of loan stocks (convertible or otherwise) listed on SEDOL 
increased from 15 in 1950 to just over 600 in 1970, they accounted for just a small portion of 
the stock of fixed interest securities (Thomas 1978, p. 156). As with debentures, the use of this 
debt instrument reversed sharply from the 1970s onwards, with just over 60 loan stocks listed in 
2002. 
25 “Resurrecting the Corporate Bond,” The Times, July 1st 1981. See the following for  
further press coverage of the moribund state of the market in this period: “Inflation: Now for the 
Hard Bit,” The Economist, May 29th 1982, p. 36; “Corporate Treasurers in Bondage,” The 
Economist, Aug. 28th 1982; “Debentures on the Horizon,” The Times, Oct. 3rd 1977; “A Ripple 
in the Debenture Market,” The Times, Oct. 13th 1977; “Long-Term Corporate Bonds May 
Return,” The Times, Mar. 30th 1981; “Debentures Set For Revival,” The Times Aug. 23rd 1982. 
There were some attempts to issue unsecured long-term bonds at this time, but this market never 
developed. See, for example, “Industrial Group Moves to Lessen Short-Term Debt,” The Times 
Sept. 10th 1982. 
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FIGURE 3 
VALUE OF DEBENTURES RELATIVE TO TOTAL VALUE OF ALL DOMESTIC 
CORPORATE SECURITIES, 18731999 
 
Notes: We use Michie’s figure for 1960 as an estimate for 1959. The total market data for  
1873, 1883, 1945, and 1959 may include some non-domestic companies, but these are unlikely 
to have much bearing on the estimates. 
Sources: Debenture data is from Investor’s Monthly Manual (18731929), Stock Exchange 
Daily Official List (19451999), and Stock Exchange Official Yearbook (19591999). 
We use the nominal values of domestic corporate securities in Morgan and Thomas, Stock 
Exchange (pp. 28081) as proxies for market value in 1873 and 1883. The market value of  
total domestic corporate securities for 1895, 1900, 1913, and 1929 is from Musacchio 
(2010, p. 51). The figures for 1945 and 1959 are from Michie (1999, pp. 360, 440). The figures 
for 19691999 are from the London Stock Exchange (2011). 
 
(Musacchio 2010, p. 58). However, nearly one hundred years later, the 
U.K. corporate bond market is one of the smallest relative to GDP at 
36th amongst the 44 most advanced economies 2011.26 
 
  
 
26 These figures are based on Bank for International Settlements (BIS) figures on  
domestic debt securities issued by corporations (Bank for International Settlements,  
BIS Quarterly Review, p. A115). The BIS figures do not distinguish between short-term  
and long-dated corporate bonds. The GDP figures were obtained from the World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator).  
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LAW AND THE U.K. CORPORATE BOND MARKET 
 
 The “law and finance” hypothesis suggests that creditor protection  
is associated with better developed debt markets (La Porta et al. 1997, 
1998, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, p. 294; 
Djankov et al. 2008). More controversially, however, its proponents 
also claim that legal origin matters for the strength of these laws, with 
common law countries having superior protection to civil law countries. 
Therefore, the United Kingdom (more precisely England), as the home 
of the common law, is an interesting case study on the evolution of 
creditor protection law and its relationship to the development of the 
market for corporate debt. 
 In the construction of their creditor rights index, there are four rights 
deemed important by La Porta et al.—no automatic stay on assets, 
secured creditors get paid first, creditors approve reorganization,  
and management does not stay during reorganization (La Port et al. 
1998, p. 1124).27 According to La Porta et al. (1998), the law on the  
books in 1995 meant that creditors in the United Kingdom had  
all four of these rights. We examine the evolution of company 
legislation from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards to see 
which creditor rights applied over the period 1860 to 2002. Company 
legislation in the U.K. governed the establishment and operation of 
U.K. companies and established the rights of creditors as well as  
shareholders vis-à-vis the company and its management. The Company 
Clauses Consolidation Act (1845) and the Company Clauses Act (1863) 
governed the activities of railways and other public utility companies, 
whilst the Companies Acts from 1862 onwards governed the activities 
of most other companies. What these acts reveal is that creditors had the 
four rights deemed important by La Porta et al. (1998) throughout our 
entire sample period.  
 The legal origins theory posits that common law countries  
have better investor protection, and better developed markets.  
However, as we established above, the market for corporate bonds 
started contracting after 1913, and essentially became irrelevant after 
the 1970s, despite a substantial renaissance in the 1950s and 1960s.  
All this variation occurred without any change in the United Kingdom’s 
creditor protection score. Something other than statute law was driving 
bond market development over the long run.  
 
27 Although the so-called “London Approach” may offer an informal manager-friendly 
substitute to the debtor-friendly law on the books, it is a far cry from a manager-driven 
bankruptcy process (Armour, Cheffins, and Skeel 2002, pp. 175760; Brierly and Vlieghe 
1999).  
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 In fact, the law and finance literature perhaps overemphasizes the 
importance of statutory investor protection law in common law countries. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, there were legal innovations that 
came from case law that perhaps help us understand the initial takeoff  
of the bond market. Sometime during the 1860s, English lawyers began 
drafting contracts with a floating charge, which was where a creditor was 
granted security against all present and future assets, but was prevented 
from interfering with the operations of the firm until it officially entered 
bankruptcy (Armour, Cheffins, and Skeel 2002, p. 1739; Finnie 1931,  
p. 45). When a firm officially entered the bankruptcy process, the holders 
of the floating charge debentures had a claim on all the assets of the firm. 
The floating charge was initially slow to obtain judicial recognition 
(Pennington 1960, p. 642), but in a series of cases, the validity of the 
floating charge was upheld.28 The innovation of the floating charge and 
the legal validity it acquired in the 1870s resulted in the widespread use 
of debentures by all types of companies (Simonson 1920, p. 26; Jefferys 
1977, p. 273).29  
 The law and finance school of thought could perhaps argue that  
the role of the judiciary in supporting the development of the floating 
charge is perhaps a testament to the common-law way of doing things 
—judges resolving contractual disputes, responding dynamically to a 
new business environment, and creating precedents that enabled future, 
similar contracts to be made on a firmer basis.30 However, the doctrine 
of the floating charge comes from equity not common law principles, 
and the cases in the 1870s where judges underpinned the validity of the 
floating charge were heard in the Chancery Court not the common law 
courts (Curtis 1941, p. 131; Pennington 1960, p. 630).  
 
EXPLAINING VARIATION OF BOND MARKET OVER TIME 
 
 The U.K. corporate bond market experienced a great reversal in  
the twentieth century, albeit with a brief but substantial renaissance in 
 
28 In Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co. (1870), LR 5 Ch App 318,  
the judge ruled that the word “undertaking” in the company’s 1866 debenture contract covered 
all the company’s assets at the point of bankruptcy. Re Florence Land Co. (1878), 10 Ch D 530; 
Re Colonial Trusts (1879), 15 Ch D 465; Re Henry Pound (1889), 42 Ch D 402. See Pennington 
(1960, p. 630) and “The Debentures of Limited Companies,” The Economist, Jan. 16th1886, p. 
67, which discusses the frequency with which cases on floating charges came before the courts. 
29 The ubiquity of the floating charge was such that a 1906 Parliamentary Committee stated 
that it was almost universally used by companies issuing debentures, and in many cases, the 
floating charge was practically the only security which could be issued (Parliamentary Papers 
1906, pp. 1415). 
30 On this point, see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) and La Porta et al. (2000,  
pp. 9, 12). 
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the 1950s and 1960s. As established above, structural theories about 
legal origin and creditor protection cannot explain this phenomenon. 
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales (2003) argue that financial markets 
contracted during the 19301970 period due to incumbent opposition  
to financial development, which thrived thanks to reduced openness  
to trade and capital flows. The subsequent recovery of financial  
markets after the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement is largely 
due to the fact that increased capital flows and trade openness 
undermined incumbent opposition to financial development. However, 
the development of the U.K. corporate bond market in the twentieth 
century does not quite fit with this theory. First, the corporate bond 
market did not contract in the post-1945 period—indeed it expanded 
rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, the corporate bond market 
shriveled up after cross-border trade and capital flows were liberalized 
after 1970. Consequently, in the rest of this section, we test two 
hypotheses about what drove U.K. corporate bond markets in the 
twentieth century. In the first hypothesis, we analyze whether inflation 
can explain the demise of the U.K. bond market. In the second 
hypothesis, we examine the role of tax changes on the capital structure 
preferences of firms to see whether this explains its renaissance in the 
1950s and 1960s.  
 
Inflation 
 
 There is a well-documented negative relationship between inflation 
and financial market activity (Huybens and Smith 1999; Boyd, Levine, 
and Smith 2001). Enrico Perotti and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden (2006), 
Perotti and Armin Schwienbacher (2009) and Mark Roe and Jordan 
Seigel (2009, 2011) go further and argue that inflation partially explains 
the evolution of and variation across financial markets in the twentieth 
century. Specifically, Musacchio (2008a) finds that inflation was an 
important post-1914 driver of corporate bond market size in Brazil. 
Consequently, we hypothesize that inflation was important to the U.K. 
corporate bond market, particularly after the devaluation of sterling in 
1967. 
 In order to examine the effect of inflation on the corporate bond 
market, we calculated yearly nominal total log returns for each debenture 
by combining coupon payments with the change in the debenture price 
over the year.31 These returns were then used to calculate unweighted 
 
31 Overall, there are 48,493 price observations in the sample. 
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annual average returns.32 Nominal returns were converted into real 
returns using inflation data published by the Office of National Statistics 
(O’Donoghue et al. 2004). When aggregating returns, one also needs to 
take into account the debentures of failed companies, with the result that 
the investor could potentially lose some of their initial investment.  
We checked every delisted debenture against the Register of Defunct 
Companies, which lists the fate of companies that delisted from the stock 
exchange from 1875 onwards as well as the payment received by equity 
and debenture holders if the company was liquidated.33 Remarkably, over 
the whole sample period, only in 13 cases of delisting did debenture-
holders lose any capital. This fact underscores the “legendary security”  
of debentures, which made them very popular with investors (Jefferys 
1977, p. 280). As the Register of Defunct Companies usually states the 
amount paid back to debenture holders, the returns for that debenture 
were adjusted accordingly.34 
 Figure 4 and Appendix Table 1 present annual real and nominal  
returns for the U.K. corporate bond market over the period 18612002.35 
As can be clearly seen from the difference between the real and nominal 
returns, inflation had a substantial effect on the corporate bond  
market during World War I and in the 1970s. Table 1 examines real bond 
returns and compares them to real returns on equity and government 
bonds in four distinct inflationary periods — (a) 18611913, a period of 
low and stable inflation; (b) 19141967, which contains two bouts of  
 
 
32 Returns are unweighted as we do not have weights after 1946, and value weighting before 
1946 means that the annual returns up to that point are dominated by a few large railways. 
33 The Register of Defunct Companies was published in 1979 and contains notices of 
companies removed from the Stock Exchange Yearbook from 1875 to 1979. Subsequent defunct 
companies were included in an annual supplement of the Stock Exchange Yearbook. 
34 In a small number of cases, where the Register of Defunct Companies only stated that the 
“debenture holders were not paid in full,” it is assumed that debenture holders lost 100 percent 
of their investment. Debenture holders may have relinquished claims to interest payments 
temporarily in order to allow a company to reconstruct. For example, debenture holders are said 
to have relinquished their rights to interest during the reconstruction of several iron and steel 
companies during the 1920s (see “Company Reconstructions,” The Economist, May 7th 1932,  
p. 1039). Although we do not have systematic information or data, these were infrequent events 
and it is likely that such temporary relinquishments would have been reflected in debenture 
prices. 
35 In terms of extant estimates of the performance of the bond market, our series of nominal 
returns is highly correlated with Smith and Horne’s (1934) index of fixed interest securities  
for 18671933 (correlation coefficient = 0.86) as well as Edelstein’s (1975, 2010) series of 
debenture returns for 18701913 (correlation coefficient = 0.87). Glyn (1973, p. 236) provides 
four estimates of debenture yields for 19551958, 19591962, 19621965, and 19661969. His 
estimates for these periods are lower than ours because he subtracts income tax from the bond 
yields and he has a much smaller sample than we have.  
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FIGURE 4 
NOMINAL AND REAL DEBENTURE RETURNS, 18612002 
 
Notes: Debenture log returns are shown, and are adjusted to take account of losses incurred due 
to company liquidation. Data on payments to debenture-holders in the event of liquidation were 
obtained from Stock Exchange (1979) and annual supplements to the Stock Exchange Yearbook. 
Sources: Course of the Exchange (18601863); Investor’s Monthly Manual (18641929); Stock 
Exchange Daily Official List (19302002). O’Donoghue, Goulding, and Allen (2004) is used to 
convert nominal into real returns. 
 
wartime inflation; (c) 19681981, a period of high and volatile inflation 
which started with the devaluation of sterling and ended with the 
Conservative government’s successful attempts to reduce inflation; and 
(d) 19822002, a period when inflation was gradually brought under 
control. Three things stand out from Table 1. First, the real return  
on corporate bonds, which averaged 4.14 percent in the pre-1913 era, 
was only 1.09 percent in 19141967, which was largely due to wartime 
inflation. For example, if we remove the negative returns in 19151920, 
the arithmetic mean rises to 3.27 percent.36 Second, the real return 
during the period 19681981, when annual inflation in the U.K.  
 
 
36 The wartime experience of negative real returns on debentures led T. S. Eliot, the poet,  
to comment that “everything is in question, even the fundamental dogma of modern society that 
debentures are safer than common stocks.” Quoted in Raynes (1928, p. 46). Notably, actuaries 
began to develop a new investment strategy whereby insurance companies invested a greater of 
proportion of funds in ordinary stocks rather than debentures (Raynes 1928).  
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TABLE 1 
ANNUAL RETURNS ON U.K. DEBENTURE MARKET, 18612002  
(percent) 
 
Arithmetic 
Mean
Geometric 
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Max.  
Return
Min.  
Return
Percentage of 
Years < 0
Panel A: Debenture returns, 18612002
Nominal 5.96 5.80 6.04 28.59 10.71 11.27 
Real 2.72 2.36 8.46 37.44 26.71 28.17 
Panel B: Real debenture returns for subperiods
18611913 4.14 4.08 3.65 11.45 5.35 7.55 
19141967 1.09 0.53 10.72 37.44 21.06 42.59 
19681981 4.10 4.55 9.32 12.79 26.71 71.43 
19822002 7.85 7.69 6.06 19.45 1.88 14.29 
Panel C: Real returns on the equity market
18612002 7.63 5.97 18.92 121.40 64.80 28.87 
18611913 7.57 7.28 8.00 28.29 4.40 20.75 
19141967 6.21 4.76 17.88 50.50 34.10 37.04 
19681981 9.04 0.96 43.66 121.40 64.80 42.86 
19822002 10.50 9.27 16.02 27.50 24.00 23.81 
Panel D: Real returns on government debt market
18612002 2.01 1.37 11.53 44.50 33.40 41.55 
18611913 2.41 2.34 3.73 10.83 7.33 24.53 
19141967 0.04 -0.82 13.42 41.50 23.30 57.41 
19681981 3.44 4.63 15.86 31.90 33.40 78.57 
19822002 9.70 9.01 12.90 44.50 13.60 23.81 
Notes: Debenture log returns are shown, and are adjusted to take account of losses incurred  
due to company liquidation. Data on payments to debenture-holders in the event of liquidation 
were obtained from Stock Exchange (1979) and annual supplements to the Stock Exchange 
Yearbook. 
Sources: Debenture returns are calculated from debenture data obtained from Course of  
the Exchange (18601863), Investor’s Monthly Manual (18641929), Stock Exchange Daily 
Official List (19302002). O’Donoghue, Goulding, and Allen (2004) is used to convert the 
nominal returns into real terms.  Equity returns are from Acheson et al. (2009) for 18601870; 
Grossman (2002) for 18711913; and Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2011, pp. 16466) for 
19142002. The returns on the government debt market are based on Consol prices for the 
period 1860 to 1955, and from 1955, a portfolio of high-coupon, long-dated bonds.  Consol 
yields and government bond yields were hand collected from the Course of the Exchange for 
18601871; the annual Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom for 18711913; and Dimson, 
Marsh, and Staunton (2011, pp. 16466) for 19142002.   
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FIGURE 5 
NET DEBENTURE ISSUES (THREE-YEAR MOVING AVERAGE) AND INFLATION 
RATE, 18602002 
 
Notes: Net debenture issues for each year are calculated by subtracting the number of debenture 
redemptions from the number of new issues.  
Sources: Course of the Exchange (18601863); Investor’s Monthly Manual (18641929); Stock 
Exchange Daily Official List (19302002). The inflation rate is from O’Donoghue, Goulding, 
and Allen (2004). 
 
averaged 11.7 percent, was 4.10 percent. Conversely, equities enjoyed 
a high real average return in this period, whilst government bond returns 
were as dismal as those of corporate bonds. It is not surprising that 
inflation kept investors away from the corporate bond market at this 
time. Third, the high real return in the 19822002 period is partially due 
to firms having to pay higher coupons on their bonds to attract investors 
following the high inflation of 19681981.  
 Figure 5 reveals that the inflation which started in the late 1960s  
was followed by negative net debenture issues for nearly every year  
for the rest of the sample period, apart from 1980 and 1981, when a 
large number of property companies issued debentures. As can be seen 
from Figure 6, there was a substantial fall in the number of debenture  
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FIGURE 6 
DEBENTURE ISSUES, 19312002 
 
Sources: Stock Exchange Daily Official List (19312002).  
 
issues in the 1970s, but the post-1970 negative net issues is also 
attributable to the fact that many companies with maturing bonds did 
not issue replacements. By way of contrast, equity issues, which, as 
mentioned above, had been relatively low during the 1960s, increased 
substantially in the 1970s and 1980s (Rajan and Zingales 2003, table 4). 
 We construct a series of three-factor vector auto regression (VAR) 
models and use Granger causality tests to determine whether inflation 
provides statistically significant information about future debenture 
issues and debenture returns. Our basic hypothesis is that inflation 
Granger causes debenture issues and returns. We also look at the 
relationships between inflation, nominal returns, current bond yields, 
the bond risk premium, and issues. Each time series is tested for unit 
roots using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests: we find that inflation, yield, 
and bond risk premium are non-stationary. Consequently, these series 
are differenced when analyzing the relationship between them and  
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the other variables. The lag length (i.e., the length of time before 
inflation affects issues returns) is determined by the Akaike information 
criterion.37 
 Over the entire sample period, we find (results not tabulated)  
that inflation does not Granger cause debenture issues, which is not 
surprising given that inflation was constrained by the gold standard for 
the majority of our sample. However, whenever we focus on the period 
after sterling devaluation in 1967, inflation Granger causes debenture 
issues in every VAR specification in Table 2. In contrast to the United 
Kingdom, inflation in the United States in the 1970s (and 1980s) was  
a lot lower and less volatile. For example, the average and standard 
deviation of the annual inflation rate between 1970 and 1980 was 7.7 
and 3.2 percent for the United States, while it was 13.1 and 5.6 percent 
for the United Kingdom.38 In addition, at its peak in 19741977, the 
U.K. inflation rate averaged 18.2 percent, whilst the U.S. rate was only 
8.1 percent. Consequently, the U.S. corporate bond market was less 
affected by inflation, and once inflation fell in the early 1980s, this 
market, unlike that of the United Kingdom, experienced substantial 
growth (Jefferis 1990; Schinasi and Smith 1998). 
 Although the Wilson Committee (1980, p. 237) in 1980 identified  
the moribund state of the corporate bond market as a serious weakness 
of the British financial system, the market has never been revived.  
The Wilson Committee (1980, p. 225) argued that risk aversion on  
the part of borrowers and lenders, arising from inflation, prevented 
agreement being reached on appropriate nominal rates. One puzzle  
is why indexation did not take off in the corporate bond market.  
The Wilson Committee’s (1980, p. 237) 1978 survey of firms suggests 
that managers were reluctant to accept open-ended and potentially 
nominal terms large liabilities that could fall due at inopportune times. 
Their fears were reasonable given that U.K. inflation was volatile as 
well as high in the 1970s. 
 
Tax Shield 
 
 Debt financing is attractive to companies when interest is treated  
as a cost and thus removed from accounting profits, and when  
taxes on net income are substantial (Modigliani and Miller 1963;  
 
 
37 The criterion is superior to other tests of lag selection when sample size is under 60. 
However, our findings are robust to using alternative tests such as the Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion or the Schwartz Bayesian information criterions. See Liew (2004). 
38 Inflation data is from Williamson (2011). 
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TABLE 2 
GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS OF FACTORS AFFECTING DEBENTURE ISSUES, 
19672002 
Dependent Variables Independent Variables 2 p-value 
Panel A    
Issues Inflation  7.674*** 0.006 
Issues Risk spread 1.230 0.267 
Issues All 7.831** 0.020 
Risk spread Inflation  9.380*** 0.002 
Risk spread Issues 0.050 0.822 
Risk spread All 9.902*** 0.007 
    
Panel B     
Issues Inflation  5.406* 0.067 
Issues Nominal return 1.159 0.560 
Issues All 8.703* 0.069 
Nominal return Inflation  5.607* 0.061 
Nominal return Issues 4.624* 0.099 
Nominal return All 11.656** 0.020 
    
Panel C    
Issues Inflation  9.924*** 0.007 
Issues Yield 4.039 0.133 
Issues All 12.167** 0.016 
Yield   Inflation  10.754*** 0.005 
Yield Issues 3.523 0.172 
Yield All 13.366*** 0.010 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level. 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: Table presents Granger-causality test statistics (2) as well as their p-values. 
The dependent variable of the three-factor VAR model for each test is in the first column 
and independent variable is in the second column.  Issues is the number of debenture issues; 
Inflation is the rate of change in the U.K.’s composite price index; Risk spread is the difference 
between the yield on debentures and government bonds; Yield is the average current yield on 
debentures; Coupon is the average coupon rate on debentures. Inflation, Yield, and Risk spread 
variables are differenced as the ADF tests reveal non-stationarity. Lag length is chosen using 
Akaike information criterion (AIC). One lag is used in panel A and two lags are used in panels 
B and C. 
 
Kemsley and Nissim 2002). Second, when taxation weights on 
distributed (but not retained) profits then debt finance can be very 
attractive to companies. Third, if the taxation of dividend income  
is more severe than interest, then companies will cater to investor 
preferences for bonds over shares.  
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 The Labour government introduced a profit tax in 1947. The tax  
was higher for profits distributed to shareholders (25 percent) than  
for profits retained within the company (10 percent).39 The Labour 
government hoped to limit what was viewed as unmerited income, 
whilst at the same time encouraging companies to invest in new  
plant and machinery (Daunton 2002, pp. 201, 248). As interest could  
be charged against taxable profits, the large increase in the tax rate  
on distributed profits made debt capital much cheaper to service than 
equity. Shareholders’ reduced dividend income, allied to the fact that 
share repurchases in this period were illegal, further depressed the 
demand for equity. As banks in the late 1940s held over 80 percent of 
their deposits in some form of government debt, they were unable to 
provide the funds required by companies (Sheppard 1971, pp. 12627). 
Consequently, as can be seen from Figure 6, there was a huge spike  
in debenture issues in 1947, the bond market grew steadily after  
1949 (Figure 1). According to W. A. Thomas, tax policy, rather than 
difficulties in raising equity finance, was the most important influence 
on the volume of debentures in this period (Thomas 1978, p. 154). The 
Conservative budget of March 1958, replaced the differential system 
of profit tax with a single 10 percent tax on all profit. This reform 
marginally reduced the incentive to use debt borrowing, yet there 
was no diminution in the size of the debenture market (Figure 1).40 
 In 1965 the Labour government replaced the system of profits tax 
with a single corporate income tax (initially set at 40 percent) levied  
on profits. It also introduced a surtax on dividends. The resulting 
structure was broadly equivalent to the 19471958 tax regime save  
that distributed profits were taxed a lot more heavily than before. 
The Labour government’s goal was to induce companies to retain 
earnings with the expectation that this would directly benefit the 
company’s workers and result in a more equitable society (Daunton 
2002, pp. 29093). To ensure that these measures would not  
just result in investors taking profits as capital gains, the Labour 
government also introduced a long-term capital gains tax of 30 percent 
(Daunton 2002, p. 292). After 1965 companies’ incentives to finance 
via debt rather than equity were larger than ever before (Thomas 1978, 
p. 154). And, as can be seen from Figure 6, they did just that, the 
number of debenture issues reached unprecedented levels in 1965 and 
1966. The number of debentures on the U.K. market increased from  
567 in 1964 to 801 by 1971 (see Appendix Table 1 for full details).  
 
39 See Daunton (2002, pp. 20001). The rate for distributed profits increased to 30 percent in 
1949, and in 1951 it was raised to 50 percent (Daunton 2002, pp. 21011). 
40 See Thomas (1978, p. 154). 
        Great Reversal of the U.K. Corporate Debt Market 831 
  
Between 1964 and 1971, £2.25 billion was raised on the U.K. corporate 
bond market, twice as much as was raised on the equity market (Anon. 
1981, pp. 5456).41 
 In order to formally test the relationship between these tax changes 
and debenture issues, we regress a binary variable for the introduction 
of the new tax regimes upon debenture issues. As the post-1931  
data sources are comprehensive, we focus on the 19312002 period.  
We create two binary variables: (a) Tax_1 equals 1 in 1947 and  
1965, the years in which profits and corporation tax are introduced 
respectively, and 0 otherwise; and (b) Tax_2 equals 1 in 1947, 1948, 
1965, and 1966, the years of and years just after the taxation changes, 
and 0 otherwise. In essence, what we are testing is whether the majority 
of the population of public companies on the market immediately 
exploits the tax changes. If they do so, as is suggested by Figure 6, then 
we should not expect above-trend new issues thereafter. The regression 
results in Table 3 indicate that these tax changes had a statistically and 
economically significant effect on debenture issues, with the tax-change 
variables alone explaining 23 and 33 percent of the time-series variation 
in debenture issues.  
 
Supply of Capital 
 
 Did the variation in the importance of the U.K. corporate bond market 
have a big effect on the supply of capital to firms? Although this question 
is somewhat beyond the scope of this article, one way of looking at the 
effect of bond market variation on the overall supply of capital is to look 
at the proportion of gross fixed capital formation financed via equity  
and corporate bonds.42 In 1938 and 1960 this ratio was 0.12 and 0.11, but 
due to the inflation-induced fall in the new issue of bonds, the ratio  
fell to 0.03 in 1970 and 0.04 in 1980. It increased in 1990 and 1999 to  
0.07 and 0.09 respectively thanks to an increase in new equity issues. 
This evidence is consistent with the view that the contraction of the bond 
market may have had a detrimental effect on the supply of finance from 
the capital market.  
 
  
 
41 There was also a tax-induced increase in the use of unsecured loan stock during this period. 
Notably, the tax advantage of debt meant that the conversion of convertible loan stock at this 
time was often deferred, with the result that, despite their initial short-term nature, many of 
these securities had terms in excess of five years (Thomas 1978, pp. 15657). 
42 Gross fixed capital formation data was obtained from Sefton and Weale (1996, table A2) 
and the Office for National Statistics. Equity issues are from Rajan and Zingales (2003, table 4). 
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TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF TAX CHANGES ON DEBENTURE ISSUES, 19312002 
 (1) (2) 
Tax_1     92.886
***
(19.322)  
Tax_2      78.676
*** 
(12.929) 
Constant     34.114
*** 
(3.220) 
    32.323*** 
(3.047) 
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.238 0.337 
No. of observations 72 72 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: Dependent variable is number of debenture issues. Tax_1 equals 1 in 1947 and 1965, 
the years in which profits and corporation tax are introduced respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
Tax_2 equals 1 in 1947, 1948, 1965, and 1966, the years of and years after the taxation changes, 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
 Did the size of the bond market affect the use of debt within firms?  
In order to see whether the size of the bond market affected the use of 
debt within firms, we look at debt-equity ratios of the constituents of  
the Financial Times’ FT-30 Index (the United Kingdom’s equivalent  
of the Dow Jones). Prior to 1995 the constituents of this index seldom 
changed and were all industrial and commercial companies. From  
Table 4, we see that the average debt-equity ratio is high in 1913 when 
the corporate bond market was in its heyday in terms of value, and it is 
high in 1995 when the corporate bond market was very small. In 1935, 
in the middle of a period of bond market contraction, debt-equity ratios 
are very low. However, average debt-equity ratios had increased  
by 1965, when the bond market was in the middle of its renaissance.  
In other words, apart from in 1995, the variation in debt-equity ratios 
appears to reflect the variation in the size of the bond market. 
 Why is the debt-equity ratio so high in 1995 whenever the corporate 
bond market had contracted? One possibility is that multinational 
companies increasingly borrowed on international stock markets and the 
Eurobond market.43 However, this only applies to the largest publicly 
traded companies. A better explanation is that banks stepped into the 
gap left by the collapse of the corporate bond market. The increase  
in bank lending to companies since the early 1970s has been dramatic,  
   
 
43 A Eurobond is a bond denominated in a currency foreign to that of the country where it  
is issued e.g., a U.K. firm could issue a yen-denominated bond in London. These bonds are 
typically traded OTC and are held by institutional investors. 
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TABLE 4 
DEBT-EQUITY RATIOS OF COMPANIES IN FT-30 INDEX, 19131995 
 Mean Debt-Equity Ratio 
(%) 
Median Debt-Equity Ratio 
(%) 
1913 63.41 53.36 
1935 22.96 8.07 
1965 45.69 39.07 
1995 59.37 53.51 
Notes: The FT-30 Index, which was originally the Financial News’ FN-30 Index, commenced  
in 1935; 24 of the 1935 constituents existed in 1913; these plus six additional large commercial / 
industrial companies are included in the figures for that year. 
Sources: Company accounts for 1995 from Bloomberg, and 1913, 1935, and 1965 company 
accounts are from Stock Exchange Official Yearbooks. 
 
with banks financing the majority of companies’ borrowing requirement 
(Thomas 1978, p. 327; Anon. 1981, p. 57). As can be seen from Figure 7, 
the contraction of the debenture market coincides with the rapid growth 
in bank lending in the United Kingdom. Banks did not lend much  
to U.K. public companies prior to the 1960s as they were constrained 
by government directives which constrained lending to businesses and 
essentially tied up large proportions of bank deposits in government 
debt (Nevin and Davis 1970, p. 274; Wadsworth 1973, p. 106). For 
example, in 1950 holdings of government debt by U.K. banks were equal 
to 58 percent of bank deposits (Sheppard 1971, p. 127). These constraints 
were gradually removed during the 1960s and 1970s, and this combined 
with the entrance of foreign banks into London meant that lending, 
particularly to businesses, was able to expand dramatically. 
 Notably, the remarkable increase in the number of multiple firm-bank 
relationships observed in the 1970s is consistent with this growth in  
bank lending to publicly traded companies (Braggion and Ongena 
2011). U.K. banks, as powerful and concentrated incumbents, may have 
had incentives to frustrate the renaissance of the domestic corporate  
bond market (Schinasi and Smith 1998, pp. 2730; Rajan and Zingales 
2003).44 Alternatively, as the banking and shadow-banking systems 
increasingly met the borrowing needs of firms, there may have been less 
need for a domestic corporate debt market. 
 What the above evidence seems to suggest is that during the first  
100 years of the U.K. bond market’s existence, if public companies 
wanted to finance via debt, the corporate bond market was the only 
important source of debt finance. However, after the 1960s the rise of the 
Eurobond OTC markets and the huge increase in bank lending to industry 
meant that there were substitutes for corporate bonds.   
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FIGURE 7 
VALUE OF DOMESTIC DEBENTURES TRADED ON U.K. STOCK EXCHANGES AND 
BANK LENDING, 18601999 
 
Notes: Sheppard’s figure for 1880 is used as an estimate for 1879. 
Sources: Course of the Exchange (18601863); Investor’s Monthly Manual (18641929); 
Stock Exchange Daily Official List (19301999); Stock Exchange Official Yearbook  
(19591999). GDP data is from Officer (2011). Loans and advances of U.K. banks for  
18801959 from Sheppard (1971) and M4 lending for 19691999 from the Bank of England 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/abstract/part2.aspx). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 After experiencing over half a century of growth, the U.K. corporate 
bond market suffered a great reversal in the twentieth century. Structural 
theories about legal origin and creditor protection cannot explain  
this phenomenon as creditor protection scores remain unchanged over  
the entire sample period. Indeed, investor protection legislation and the 
common law cannot even be credited with stimulating the takeoff of the 
U.K. debenture market. 
 We test two explanations for the twentieth-century variation in  
the U.K. corporate bond market. First, we find that inflation was  
a major cause of the decline of the market from the late 1960s 
onwards. The very high inflation in the 1970s and 1980s drove the 
market down in several ways. Inflation and the uncertainty it caused, 
eroded the real value of corporate bonds and accelerated bond 
redemptions without a counterbalancing rise in new issues (Anon. 
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1981, p. 56; Wilson Committee 1980, pp. 19 and 225). Second, we 
find that government taxation policies after World War II provided a 
large incentive to companies to use debt finance. Not only was there 
the classic tax shield (i.e., interest payments on debt could reduce 
taxable profits), but there was also a higher tax rate if profits were 
distributed rather than being retained. Given the constraints on bank 
lending, companies turned to the corporate bond market. As a result, 
this market reached its zenith, in terms of the number of debentures 
traded on the market, in the late 1960s. 
 Although inflation and taxation policies are visible causes of  
the variation in the twentieth-century U.K. corporate bond market,  
they themselves are driven by political economy. The main underlying 
driving force which may explain the postwar renaissance and post-1970 
decline in the U.K. corporate bond market is the growth of social 
democracy. The advocates of social democratic economic policy in  
the United Kingdom were empowered by the combination of universal 
suffrage and the human and physical destruction experienced during 
World War II.45 The voters of the post-World War II period brought to 
power a government who intended to rebuild the U.K. economy with  
a combination of government spending on housing and infrastructure 
and privately funded capital deepening. The tax-induced renaissance  
of the bond market was an indirect consequence of the postwar Labour 
government’s attempts to redistribute income, stimulate investment,  
and limit what it perceived to be unmerited income (i.e., dividends). 
The high inflation of the 1970s had some of its roots in the policy 
choices of the prevailing social democratic preferences of U.K. voters. 
The unwillingness of successive U.K. governments in the 1970s to 
implement contractionary monetary and fiscal policies to combat high 
inflation was driven by the fear that such policies would result in the 
then-powerful trade unions fomenting industrial unrest.  
  
 
45 Roe (2006) argues that the devastation wrought during the two world wars determines the 
strength of modern stock markets. 
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Appendix 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1A 
U.K. CORPORATE BOND MARKET, 18602002 
Sectoral Breakdown of No. of  Debentures  
(%) 
Year No. of Debentures Railways Breweries 
Commercial and 
Industrial 
1860 9 100.00 —     — 
1861 8 100.00 —     — 
1862 10 100.00 —     — 
1863 10 100.00 —     — 
1864 12 83.33 — 8.33 
1865 13 84.62 — 7.69 
1866 15 86.67 — 6.67 
1867 19 89.47 — 5.26 
1868 28 92.86 — 3.57 
1869 29 93.10 — 3.45 
1870 31 93.55 — 3.22 
1871 32 93.75 — 3.13 
1872 36 94.44 — 2.78 
1873 37 94.59 — 2.70 
1874 39 92.31 — 2.56 
1875 42 90.48 — 2.38 
1876 49 91.84 — 2.04 
1877 56 89.29 — 1.79 
1878 61 85.25 — 3.28 
1879 63 84.13 — 3.17 
1880 66 81.82 — 4.55 
1881 74 79.73 — 4.05 
1882 77 80.52 — 3.90 
1883 84 80.95 — 3.57 
1884 85 79.76 — 4.76 
1885 88 80.23 — 4.65 
1886 93 79.12 — 4.40 
1887 97 75.79   2.11 6.32 
1888 102 72.00   5.00 6.00 
1889 108 66.98   7.55 8.49 
1890 129 58.40 12.80 11.20 
1891 136 56.06 15.15 10.61 
1892 135 51.54 16.15 13.08 
1893 140 50.37 17.78 12.59 
1894 126 53.66 22.76 1.63 
1895 184 38.07 23.86 19.89 
1896 217 31.40 28.99 22.71 
1897 264 29.03 30.24 26.21 
1898 282 27.00 31.18 27.76 
1899 297 25.54 30.94 29.50 
1900 328 23.28 31.48 28.52 
1901 366 21.28 28.86 31.20 
1902 383 20.28 28.61 31.39 
1903 378 17.46 29.01 32.96 
1904 398 18.93 28.00 32.80 
1905 421 18.41 26.85 33.76 
1906 426 18.34 27.39 33.67 
1907 433 19.31 26.98 32.67 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1A — continued 
Sectoral Breakdown of No. of  Debentures  
(%) 
Year No. of Debentures Railways Breweries 
Commercial and 
Industrial 
1908 436 19.41 27.03 31.45 
1909 436 19.66 26.78 31.94 
1910 422 19.49 26.84 31.90 
1911 420 19.64 26.53 32.14 
1912 406 20.11 26.19 31.22 
1913 399 20.43 26.08 30.65 
1914 396 20.71 26.43 30.52 
1915 397 20.38 26.90 30.43 
1916 394 20.55 27.12 30.68 
1917 392 20.66 27.27 30.58 
1918 391 20.78 27.42 29.64 
1919 379 21.55 27.59 29.02 
1920 375 21.87 27.70 28.28 
1921 373 22.19 27.22 27.81 
1922 369 18.18 27.58 28.48 
1923 350 9.84 30.16 31.48 
1924 349 8.97 29.24 30.90 
1925 343 6.85 29.45 31.16 
1926 338 7.07 30.04 31.10 
1927 341 7.42 30.39 30.04 
1928 331 7.75 31.73 28.41 
1929 317 8.24 32.55 29.02 
1930 463 5.59 31.94 36.13 
1931 516 5.47 31.93 38.32 
1932 554 5.66 32.25 37.91 
1933 524 4.04 34.50 36.51 
1934 512 3.94 34.90 36.59 
1935 497 3.90 35.67 34.89 
1936 507 3.85 34.49 34.10 
1937 510 4.05 35.45 33.14 
1938 511 4.05 35.45 33.33 
1939 519 4.17 35.48 33.59 
1940 397 5.49 32.92 32.92 
1941 389 5.67 32.99 32.73 
1942 375 6.17 31.90 33.24 
1943 366 6.37 32.13 31.86 
1944 353 6.55 32.76 30.77 
1945 342 6.78 33.63 30.09 
1946 319 7.23 34.59 28.30 
1947 411 5.10 33.50 33.25 
1948 333 0.30 40.77 40.18 
1949 311 0.32 44.13 44.76 
1950 324 0.31 43.56 46.93 
1951 329 0.30 44.31 49.40 
1952 340 0.29 44.35 49.86 
1953 348     — 41.93 52.41 
1954 380     — 39.74 54.29 
1955 393     — 38.69 54.27 
1956 410     — 38.22 54.57 
1957 422     — 36.51 56.05 
1958 445     — 34.96 57.52 
1959 462     — 33.76 58.39 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1A — continued 
Sectoral Breakdown of No. of  Debentures  
(%) 
Year No. of Debentures Railways Breweries 
Commercial and 
Industrial 
1960 474 — 32.71 59.21 
1961 473 — 31.26 59.63 
1962 490 — 29.20 61.80 
1963 522 — 28.44 62.52 
1964 567 — 28.52 63.65 
1965 665 — 25.41 67.61 
1966 775 — 20.43 73.82 
1967 819 — 19.83 76.06 
1968 810 — 19.19 76.77 
1969 810 — 16.89 79.31 
1970 812 — 16.46 79.63 
1971 801 — 16.32 79.73 
1972 775 — 16.35 79.57 
1973 750 — 16.64 79.26 
1974 766 — 16.30 77.49 
1975 720 — 16.28 78.21 
1976 697 — 16.12 78.46 
1977 662 — 16.07 78.68 
1978 614 — 16.43 78.60 
1979 587 — 16.37 78.61 
1980 588 — 15.61 76.67 
1981 632 — 15.65 70.29 
1982 611 — 16.09 67.66 
1983 575 — 15.85 66.90 
1984 552 — 15.78 66.06 
1985 511 — 17.26 62.10 
1986 469 — 17.42 61.29 
1987 399 — 17.22 59.49 
1988 330 — 18.40 55.52 
1989 301 — 18.18 55.89 
1990 268 — 16.23 50.94 
1991 273 — 11.15 45.72 
1992 294 — 9.25 35.96 
1993 224 — 9.46 29.73 
1994 195 — 9.33 28.50 
1995 181 — 10.61 27.93 
1996 166 — 9.70 28.48 
1997 164 — 12.80 28.66 
1998 160 — 14.38 29.38 
1999 158 — 13.29 29.11 
2000 151 — 11.92 29.14 
2001 154 — 11.04 30.52 
2002 154 — 11.04 30.52 
Notes: Debenture log returns are shown, and are adjusted to take account of losses incurred  
due to company liquidation. Data on payments to debenture holders in the event of liquidation 
were obtained from Stock Exchange (1979) and annual supplements to the Stock Exchange 
Yearbook. 
Sources: Course of the Exchange (18601863); Investor’s Monthly Manual (18641929); Stock 
Exchange Daily Official List (19302002); Stock Exchange Official Yearbook (19591999). 
O’Donoghue, Goulding, and Allen (2004) is used to convert the nominal value into real terms. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1B 
U.K. CORPORATE BOND MARKET, 18602002 
 
Annual Returns 
(%) 
Total Par Value of Debentures  
(£) 
Year       Nominal    Real Nominal Real 
1860      —     —     5,800,101     5,800,101 
1861  2.84 0.14     5,290,101     5,147,268 
1862  4.66 7.26     5,640,344     5,630,744 
1863  4.88 8.48     5,701,527     5,896,729 
1864  1.64 2.54   12,158,558    12,688,001 
1865  4.06 3.16   11,382,650    11,771,401 
1866  1.15 5.35   11,997,620    11,600,895 
1867  3.97 2.13   13,019,041    11,820,640 
1868  8.03 9.73   22,920,366    21,164,328 
1869  4.86 9.86   28,234,086    27,057,441 
1870  7.04 7.04   36,797,028    35,676,725 
1871  8.48 7.08   41,203,781    39,390,021 
1872  5.87 1.17   48,941,486    44,588,124 
1873  5.13 2.03   55,662,402    49,139,165 
1874  6.96 10.26   62,231,061    56,750,978 
1875  5.75 7.65   68,513,739    63,667,530 
1876  5.85 6.15   77,404,763    72,145,450 
1877  3.72 4.42   87,243,501    81,884,899 
1878  2.60 4.80   95,639,526    91,740,065 
1879  6.72 11.12 100,828,506 100,973,047 
1880  6.98 3.98 105,894,483 102,864,897 
1881  4.46 5.56 113,529,682 111,494,756 
1882  3.73 2.73 117,343,328 114,087,645 
1883  3.23 3.73 125,281,703 122,414,799 
1884  6.07 8.77 132,062,447 132,524,465 
1885  2.81 5.81 136,504,317 141,091,331 
1886  4.28 5.88 136,204,619 143,034,067 
1887  5.67 6.17 153,482,372 161,984,036 
1888  7.51 6.81 157,650,377 165,218,234 
1889  5.97 4.57 176,739,623 182,630,707 
1890  2.77 2.57 228,086,817 235,218,027 
1891  3.42 2.72 208,297,610 213,306,433 
1892  5.62 5.22 220,656,732 225,058,897 
1893  5.27 5.97 259,484,990 266,514,422 
1894  9.45 11.45 264,507,999 277,106,975 
1895  7.85 8.85 295,681,562 312,863,042 
1896  5.24 5.54 292,320,368 310,234,456 
1897  3.48 1.98 316,657,000 331,021,557 
1898  1.42 1.12 332,093,463 346,116,792 
1899  1.13 0.43 339,495,369 351,354,439 
1900  0.94 4.16 354,280,348 347,956,430 
1901  1.67 1.17 367,810,782 359,439,118 
1902  3.75 3.75 382,330,861 373,628,709 
1903  1.08 0.68 366,029,189 356,267,283 
1904  2.61 2.81 415,321,306 405,053,282 
1905  4.61 4.21 427,202,565 414,974,236 
1906  0.50 0.50 431,698,834 419,341,803 
1907  0.77 1.97 440,144,725 422,415,386 
1908  3.38 2.88 450,976,834 430,647,114 
1909  3.14 2.64 455,465,242 432,758,522 
1910  3.43 2.53 453,622,009 427,128,116 
1911 4.94 4.84 458,392,358 431,188,232 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1B — continued 
 
Annual Returns 
(%) 
Total Par Value of Debentures  
(£) 
Year       Nominal    Real Nominal Real 
1912 3.99 0.99 456,777,782 416,779,392 
1913 2.98 3.38 455,047,774 416,861,678 
1914 6.26 6.56 463,623,514 425,991,924 
1915 4.66 17.16 467,504,762 375,863,370 
1916 1.11 19.21 467,128,389 307,584,274 
1917 4.14 21.06 465,095,780 229,071,924 
1918 7.51 14.49 466,647,617 179,272,271 
1919 3.91 6.19 466,433,394 161,091,785 
1920 4.71 20.11 465,654,468 136,056,062 
1921 9.41 18.01 477,244,972 151,434,667 
1922 23.44 37.44 499,777,227 180,786,194 
1923 8.18 14.18 483,101,755 185,239,363 
1924 6.68 7.38 495,322,105 191,254,580 
1925 4.15 3.85 502,092,579 193,287,200 
1926 5.26 6.06 511,515,954 198,490,172 
1927 5.69 8.09 525,078,333 208,643,029 
1928 6.93 7.23 535,365,486 213,368,883 
1929 1.63 2.53 539,392,624 216,908,656 
1930 9.04 11.84 590,143,894 243,962,409 
1931 3.47 7.77 629,161,140 271,275,888 
1932 18.85 21.45 656,106,944 290,249,378 
1933 12.01 14.11 622,385,305 281,113,522 
1934 10.78 10.78 624,700,526 282,159,240 
1935 7.09 6.39 622,028,919 278,985,885 
1936 5.15 4.45 646,204,074 287,799,871 
1937 2.28 1.12 646,709,100 278,231,951 
1938 1.05 0.55 660,457,549 279,600,560 
1939 2.19 4.99 691,031,849 284,352,766 
1940 3.14 13.66 671,319,542 229,832,800 
1941 12.27 1.47 662,111,272 202,198,791 
1942 9.32 2.22 658,153,689 186,719,901 
1943 6.29 2.89 651,488,462 178,544,774 
1944 5.54 2.84 627,428,488 167,308,301 
1945 4.63 1.83 620,463,094 160,818,302 
1946 8.61 5.51 602,206,340 151,247,644 
1947 0.64 7.64 — — 
1948 3.28 4.42 — — 
1949 3.11 5.91 — — 
1950 4.71 1.61 — — 
1951 4.05 13.15 — — 
1952 1.14 10.34 — — 
1953 10.11 7.01 — — 
1954 8.33 6.53 — — 
1955 6.87 11.37 — — 
1956 1.87 6.77 — — 
1957 1.23 4.93 — — 
1958 9.31 6.31 — — 
1959 8.00 7.40 513,068,294   68,999,581 
1960 0.90 0.10 — — 
1961 0.61 2.79 — — 
1962 10.01 5.71 — — 
1963 8.86 6.86 — — 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1B — continued 
 
Annual Returns 
(%) 
Total Par Value of Debentures  
(£) 
Year       Nominal     Real Nominal Real 
1964 3.03 0.27 — — 
1965 2.75 2.05 — — 
1966 1.86 2.04 — — 
1967 5.20 2.70 — — 
1968 0.22 4.92 — — 
1969 5.79 11.19 1,685,992,301 158,143,979 
1970 7.16 0.76 — — 
1971 15.92 6.52 — — 
1972 6.98 0.12 — — 
1973 3.06 12.26 — — 
1974 10.71 26.71 — — 
1975 18.31 5.89 — — 
1976 15.37 1.13 — — 
1977 28.59 12.79 — — 
1978 10.17 1.87 — — 
1979 9.55 3.85 1,677,207,865     40,005,883 
1980 10.49 7.51 — — 
1981 6.09 5.81 — — 
1982 27.28 18.68 — — 
1983 14.89 10.29 — — 
1984 10.95 5.95 — — 
1985 11.98 5.88 — — 
1986 10.54 7.14 — — 
1987 13.69 9.49 — — 
1988 8.95 4.05 — — 
1989 6.37 1.43 3,102,269,359     33,739,922 
1990 7.62 1.88 — — 
1991 17.20 11.30 — — 
1992 13.71 10.01 — — 
1993 21.05 19.45 — — 
1994 0.96 1.44 — — 
1995 11.96 8.46 — — 
1996 11.27 8.87 — — 
1997 19.09 15.99 — — 
1998 18.60 15.20 — — 
1999 7.97 6.47 5,622,203,877     41,821,041 
2000 7.04 4.04 — — 
2001 4.65 2.85 — — 
2002 7.21 5.51 — — 
Notes: See the notes in Appendix Table 1A . 
Sources: See the sources in Appendix Table 1A . 
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